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E. BEMENT & SONS V. NATIONAL HARROW COMPANY: 
THE FIRST SKIRMISH BETWEEN PATENT LAW AND THE SHERMAN ACT 
Amelia Smith Rinehart† 
INTRODUCTION 
E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Company,1 a practically forgotten 1902 Sherman 
Act case involving the Harrow Trust, tells the story of patent law’s uneasy transformation from a 
quaint and comfortable nineteenth century role of private protection for inventors to the nuanced 
picture of innovation, exclusion, and regulation that we experience today. In this first case 
considering a patent license under the Sherman Act,2 the Court held that the licenses in suit did 
not violate the Sherman Act’s prohibition of restraints in trade, despite broad price restrictions, 
exclusive arrangements, and required grantbacks for patents and applications claiming 
improvements.3 The Court declared persuasively,  
Notwithstanding these exceptions [for the police power of state], the general rule 
is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United 
States. The very object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few 
exceptions, that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with 
regard to this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the 
licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by 
the courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or 
fix prices does not render them illegal.4 
 
                                                
†  Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, S. J. Quinney College of 
Law, the University of Utah. Many thanks to Bruce Boyden, Bob Brauneis, Teneille Brown, Jorge Contreras, Sam 
Ernst, Brian Frye, Shubha Ghosh, Cathy Hwang, RonNell Andersen Jones, Jessica Kiser, Wayne McCormack, Marc 
Rinehart, and Zvi Rosen for substantive suggestions and to Brandon Fuller for editing and research assistance. This 
research was made possible, in part, through generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty 
Excellence. Any errors are my own. 
 
1  186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
 
2  Id. at 83. 
 
3  Id. at 95.  
 




In this sweeping statement, nine years before Standard Oil Co. v. United States5 
established the rule of reason for antitrust liability,6 the Bement Court appeared to give antitrust 
immunity to patent license provisions integral to an early patent pool,7 setting an important 
foundation for a permissive antitrust approach to patent licensing in the early twentieth century.8 
As the Court turned away from this permissive approach to a more skeptical one mid-century,9 
Bement survived with little commentary from courts.10 In the modern era, Bement has fallen into 
relative obscurity.11 In FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,12 the Court’s most recent antitrust case regarding 
settlement agreements between patent-owning pharmaceutical companies and generic companies 
in the shadow of federal drug regulation,13 the majority and the dissent both echoed portions of 
Justice Peckham’s Bement decision with respect to limitations that antitrust law may place on a 
patent owner’s right to exclude,14 yet the Court did not cite Bement.15 
                                                
5  221 U.S. 1, 30 (1911).  
 
6  See id. at 66; WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 256–57 (The University of Chicago ed., Greenwood Press 1980).  
 
7  Bement, 186 U.S. at 94.  
 
8  Id.  
 
9  R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att’y. Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address to British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law Conference: Antitrust Law in the U.S. Supreme Court (May 11, 2004).  
 
10  Citing references for E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., LEXISNEXIS, 
https://advance.lexis.com/shepards/shepardspreview/ (cited 247 times with only twenty-nine cases actually 
discussing the case). 
 
11  Id. (only cited thirty-seven times since January 1, 1980). 
 
12  133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).  
 
13  See id.  
 
14  Id. at 2231 (“[A] valid patent excludes all except its owner from the use of protected process of product.”) 
(quoting United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948))); Id. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
point of patent law is to grant limited monopolies as a way of encouraging innovation. Thus, a patent grants ‘the 
right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.’”) (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas 




What accounts for the disappearance of Bement as a leading case? One explanation is 
merely procedural—the Bement Court limited its review to the contracts in evidence, not the 
entire horizontal cartelization scheme.16 The other is substantive—Bement, deciding whether the 
Sherman Act could regulate patent owner conduct, presents two competing viewpoints, which 
confused early courts.17 On the one hand, the Bement Court framed patents as mechanisms for 
gaining a legal monopoly, suggesting that the “absolute freedom” inherent in the patent owner’s 
right to exclude would apply broadly to the other licenses in the combination, individually or 
grouped into a pool.18 On the other hand, the Court also directly observed limitations to this 
absolute freedom, and emphasized that any immunity from antitrust scrutiny for patent owner 
conduct would be tied to reasonableness.19 But these principles—which inform the legality of 
reasonable restrictions within the scope of the patent grant—remain at the forefront of the patent 
and antitrust interface, even as the case itself has been marginalized.20  
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the growth of the Harrow Trust and 
the trust’s scheme for maintaining market share for spring tooth harrows through a national 
holding company, National Harrow Company (“National Harrow”). Part II explains how a 
dispute arose between National Harrow and one of its relatively influential licensees, E. Bement 
& Sons, and follows the litigation through to its final judgment from the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                       
15  See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2232–33. 
 
16  Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 83 (1902). 
 
17  Id. at 91. Although, to be fair, the Supreme Court in other Sherman Act cases had been less than clear about 
the reach of the statute beyond what the common law already regulated. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United 
States, 175 U.S. 211, 229 (1899); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n., 166 U.S. 290, 320–22 (1897). 
 
18  Bement, 186 U.S. at 91.  
 
19  Id. at 92 (citing Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 342). 
 




Court. Finally, Part III describes the life and near death of Bement in the twentieth century and 
beyond, from early acceptance to later sidelining. In this Part, I observe that Bement’s conflict 
remains relevant today in cases examining patent owner conduct through the lens of antitrust. 
I. THE HARROW TRUST 
After the Civil War, the United States transformed into an economic and industrial 
powerhouse, with remarkably high levels of inventive activity and issued patents.21 As a result, 
by 1890, the United States led the world in the value of its manufactured goods, many of which 
were patented articles.22 This explosion of production resulted in unbridled competition in many 
industries, which, in turn, led to industrial organization in the form of so-called “trusts.”23  
Not surprisingly, 1890 also marked the passage by Congress of the Sherman Act, which 
prohibited contracts and combinations in restraint of trade as well as monopolizing.24 Senator 
John Sherman, speaking in support of the statute, described industrial combinations that 
controlled production, transportation, and sales of life’s necessities as holding the “power to 
prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity.”25 This proliferation of trusts 
                                                
21  SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE: FROM THE DEATH OF LINCOLN TO THE RISE OF 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT 17 (2d ed. 1988); see A.B. LEVY, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AND THEIR CONTROL I, at 147 
(Karl Mannheim ed., 1950).  
 
22  CASHMAN, supra note 21, at 15. 
 
23  See CASHMAN, supra note 21, at 52–59.  
 
A trust is an equitable obligation, either express or implied, resting upon a person by reason of a 
confidence reposed in him, to apply or deal with the property for the benefit of some other person, 
or for the benefit of himself and another or others, according to such confidence. 
 
  McCreary v. Gewinner, 29 S.E. 960, 963 (Ga. 1898). Trusts, applied here, were used by manufacturers to 
create monopolies, a practice which was ultimately outlawed by the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. Standard Oil 
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1911). 
 
24  Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647 § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
 




governing manufactured goods important to everyday life ran up against the political, social, and 
judicial responses to them.26 Nowhere was this more apparent than in the case of the Harrow 
Trust and National Harrow.  
The story of the Harrow Trust begins with the invention in 1869 by David L. Garver of 
the spring tooth harrow,27 one of three types of harrows generally used by farmers to cultivate 
land.28 Garver’s invention, a flexible harrow tooth that glides over obstacles in soil, enjoyed little 
success until 1877 when Dewitt C. Reed invented an improved version that allowed for adjusting 
the tooth down or up to create more or less depth in the soil.29 Together, the Garver and Reed 
patents formed the foundation for almost all postbellum spring tooth harrow technology.30 Other 
manufacturers entered the spring tooth harrow field in competition with these companies “in 
hostility to the same letters patent.”31 Some manufacturers obtained their own patents covering 
structural arrangements, the only features generally not believed to be controlled by Garver, 
                                                
26  See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and 
Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 281–83 (1989). 
 
27  U.S. Patent No. 95,458 (issued Oct. 5, 1869). 
 
28  “A cultivating tool set with spikes, teeth, or disks and used primarily for breaking up and smoothing the 
soil.” Harrow, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/harrow (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2017); see ROBERT L. ARDREY, AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS: A REVIEW OF INVENTION 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES 21–22 (1894) (providing 
that a harrow breaks up ground, removes weeds, and covers seeds once planted). A harrow essentially moves over 
the surface as compared to a plow that renders deeper cuts into the cultivated land. William Strait, Mr. Strait on 
Harrow Patents, FARM IMPLEMENT NEWS, Dec. 29, 1892, at 16. Both are very common farm implements. Id. 
 
29  U.S. Patent No. 201,946 (issued Apr. 2, 1878). See Reed v. Smith, 40 F. 882, 884 (E.D. Mich. 1890) 
(finding the Reed patent limited to the clip and not covering an important longitudinal adjustment invented by John 
Paddock in 1872 with respect not to harrows but to rakes). U.S. Patent No. 125,216, cited as important prior art in 
Reed, had been purchased by Bement to defend against Reed’s infringement actions against its customers, of which 
one was Smith. See id. at 883–84; U.S. Patent No. 125,216 (issued Apr. 2, 1872). Known as the Paddock patent, it 
apparently “cut quite a figure in the spring tooth harrow litigation.” Strait, supra note 28, at 16. 
 
30  Strait, supra note 28, at 16. 
 




Reed, and other prior art.32 By 1888, one source reported some twenty-five to thirty different 
harrows being manufactured under as many different patents.33 
Eventually, the Garver patent came to be owned by Reed,34 who sued multiple companies 
for patent infringement, many of which allegedly settled for “considerable sums of money” at 
some time prior to September 1890.35 After the Garver patent expired in 1886, the owners of the 
Reed patent (by then, Reed & Co. in the Midwest and Olin & Co. in the state of New York)36 
continued to claim “every one infringed their patents.”37 Reed and Olin entered into licenses with 
the four largest harrow manufacturers to settle all of these litigations involving the Reed 
patents.38  
These six firms (referred to in the harrow trade as “the Big Six”),39 who were related only 
as licensees and licensors at that point, organized the formation of National Harrow Company 
(“National Harrow”) in the fall of 1890.40 The Big Six planned to assign all of the relevant 
                                                
32  Strait, supra note 28, at 16. 
 
33  Id. 
 
34  U.S. Patent No. 9,148 (issued Apr. 13, 1880). 
 
35  Bement, 186 U.S. at 76–77.  
 
36  Transcript of Record at 137, Bement, 186 U.S. 70 (No. 215). 
 
37  Brief for Defendant at 11, Bement, 186 U.S. 70 (No. 215); Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 138. 
 
38  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 108, 138.  
 
39  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 234. These firms included Reed & Co.; Olin & Co.; Chase, Taylor 
& Co.; Lawrence, Chapin & Co.; J. M. Childs & Co.; and A. Stevens & Son of Auburn, New York. Bement, 186 
U.S. at 76. 
 
40  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 132. Large-scale factory production of farm implements emerged in 
the United States between the Civil War and the economic depression of the 1870s. Mary Beth Pudup, From Farm 
to Factory: Structuring and Location of the U.S. Farm Machinery Industry, 63 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 203, 216 (1987). 
As harrow production moved from local blacksmith shops to these large factories, harrow firms, like other farm 
implement manufacturers, engaged in forward integration that allowed them to control distribution, to allow for 
credit purchases, and not insignificantly, to best compete for sales to farmers. Id. at 217; see The Harrow Trust in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1891, at 4.  
7 
 
patents in the spring harrow field to a newly organized corporation, National Harrow, and to 
accept licenses and capital stock in return.41 The firms hoped to reduce expenditures on patent 
infringement litigation and to stabilize prices (in fact, the company bragged about lowering 
prices despite this consolidation of competitors into one national firm).42 To this end, National 
Harrow’s organizers also sought harrow firms outside of the Big Six to assign their patents to the 
company, including Bement and other manufacturers who had been heavily involved in patent 
infringement litigation over the Reed and Garver patents.43 Most of these manufacturers entered 
into form agreements that assigned their respective patents and all of their existing rights under 
them to National Harrow in exchange for capital stock in an amount to be determined by an 
arbitrator and for the exclusive license to manufacture only those harrows that they had been 
making and selling prior to joining National Harrow.44 Eventually, the number of firms who 
assigned their patents, licenses, and good will to National Harrow increased to twenty-six 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
41  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 13–15, 146–47.  
 
42  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 147. National markets for farm implements following the Civil War 
had resulted in “[f]renzied competition and price-cutting” in these sectors. Pudup, supra note 40, at 217. Notably, 
the price provision was critical for courts finding the licenses void as against public policy. See, e.g., Strait v. Nat’l 
Harrow Co., 18 N.Y.S. 224, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891). 
 
43  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 129. 
 
44  See, e.g., Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 78 (1902). All of the assignment and license 
agreements were to be signed and placed into an escrow pending execution by all of the firms, at which point the 
agreements would become operative. Id. at 86 n.1. Bement never executed its first set. Transcript of Record, supra 
note 36, at 63. William Strait executed but successfully sued to cancel his agreements prior to them becoming 
operative. Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 162. Later, some firms took licenses from National Harrow to 
manufacture and sell harrows without contributing patents to the pool. See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 
146. These firms simply agreed to a price schedule and royalty scheme for specified harrow models. See Transcript 




overall, including E. Bement & Sons (“Bement”), a harrow manufacturer brought in early in the 
fall of 1890 on the heels of its own litigation with the Big Six firms.45 
Even after the patent assignments and license agreements were executed by and between 
National Harrow, the Big Six and others referred to as outsiders,46 National Harrow continued to 
bring patent infringement suits against harrow manufacturers and dealers not in the trust,47 as 
well as licensees and dealers who sold harrows in violation of the license restrictions.48 In 
addition to this vast amount of litigation, National Harrow also waged a media campaign 
intending to funnel sales to the trust licensees with boasts about infringement suits and threats to 
bring more against dealers and farmers.49 As a result of this exposure, challenges to the legality 
of the trust agreements commenced almost immediately by parties facing National Harrow in 
court.50 
In a very early case, William Strait (an inventor on several patents in his own right and 
proprietor of erstwhile National Harrow licensee, Clipper Chilled Plow Company (“Clipper”)),51 
sued National Harrow to set aside its agreements, then in escrow awaiting the other firms to 
                                                
45  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 128. Bement entered into a preliminary agreement in September 
1890, placed into escrow, which never became operative due to a condition failure sometime before May 1891. 
Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 63. 
 
46  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 129. 
 
47  See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 
48  See A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 99 F. 160, 161 (C.C.D.N.J.) rev’d, 102 F. 714 (3d Cir. 1900). 
 
49  See Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 F. 130, 131 (C.C.D. Ind. 1895); Adriance, Platt & Co. v. Nat’l Harrow 
Co., 121 F. 827, 829 (2d Cir. 1903). A strong feeling existed among some manufacturers that the trust used litigation 
solely “to frighten the dealers into their camp and oblige them to buy inferior harrows at any price that the combine 
may see fit to place upon them.” A.E. Cole, Light on Spring Tooth Harrow Litigation, FARM IMPLEMENT NEWS, 
Mar. 31, 1898, at 29. 
 
50  See, e.g., The Harrow Trust in Court, supra note 40, at 4. 
 




execute their agreements52, so that Strait could be free to set his own price for harrows.53 The 
court, finding no breach or failure of condition by National Harrow, described the plaintiffs as 
“hav[ing] no cause of complaint, unless the contract made is an illegal contract, as hostile to the 
public good.”54 The court observed that the spring tooth harrow monopolized the harrow market, 
that all of the manufacturers in the spring tooth harrow market in 1890 had entered into identical 
agreements with National Harrow, and that all of the manufacturers agreed to not make and sell 
spring tooth harrows for fifty years except as licensees and agents of National Harrow, and then 
only as to those styles of harrows each of them manufactured prior to entering into the National 
Harrow agreement.55 Given this state of affairs, the court found that National Harrow intended to 
“engross the market, control prices, and prevent competition,” a practice condemned by the 
common law as an unlawful restraint of trade, if not the new Sherman Act.56 
After Strait, the press eagerly reported that a New York court had declared National 
Harrow “a Trust which has undertaken to control absolutely the manufacture and sale of harrows 
in the United States.”57 The New York Times ran an editorial reminding its readers that “harmony 
again prevail[ed]” because these litigations were brought by the trust or by one of its members, 
not a member of the public seeking to break the combination.58 Yet, after another suit brought 
                                                
52  Strait v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 18 N.Y.S. 224, 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891). 
 
53  Id. at 231. Although newspapers reported that Strait and his company sought an adjustment of their share of 
profits from the trust, the lower court opinion does not mention anything other than the licensee’s desire to declare 
the contracts void. Compare id. (only discussing whether the contract is void), with Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 
1891, at 4 (discussing adjustments between Strait and the Trust). 
 
54  Strait, 18 N.Y.S. at 231–32. 
 
55  Id. at 232. 
 
56  Id. at 233. 
 
57  The Harrow Trust in Court, supra note 40, at 4. 
 
58  Editorial, supra note 53. 
10 
 
against National Harrow highlighted similar exclusionary tactics, The New York Times opined, in 
reference to Strait, “[t]his ought to be enough to convince the [D]epartment [of Justice] and its 
agents that the so-called Anti-Trust law has been violated by this large and powerful 
combination.”59 
Other licensees also succeeded in defending contract claims brought by National 
Harrow.60 National Harrow sued Hench & Dromgold (“Hench”), a harrow manufacturer in the 
trust, for selling harrows at prices below the specified prices in the license agreements.61 In 
defense, Hench claimed that the agreements were void as against public policy because the 
licenses represented unlawful restraints in trade under Pennsylvania common law.62 The court 
sided with Hench, declaring its licenses invalid and unenforceable.63 The Third Circuit 
confirmed on appeal, explaining,  
The fact that the property involved is covered by letters patent is urged as a 
justification; but we do not see how any importance can be attributed to this fact. 
Patents confer a monopoly as respects the property covered by them, but they 
confer no right upon the owners of several distinct patents to combine for the 
purpose of restraining competition and trade.64 
 
The Strait and Hench suits demonstrated that courts generally were willing to find the 
National Harrow license agreements unenforceable as a matter of contract law, but the nature of 
private adjudication left the remaining licenses valid and subject to enforcement by National 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
59  Editorial, The Harrow Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1892, at 4.  
 
60  Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Hench, 76 F. 667, 670 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1896), aff’d, 83 F. 36 (3d Cir. 1897). 
 
61  Id. at 667.  
 
62  Id. at 667–68. 
 
63  Id. at 670. 
 




Harrow in contract suits and in infringement suits against defecting licensees, dealers, and 
customers.65 In infringement cases, National Harrow worked a numbers game by filing countless 
suits against dealers and customers, most of which did not make it to a hearing stage.66 In the 
four infringement suits whose opinions can be found in reported cases, licensees made the 
allegedly infringing harrows under the patents that they assigned to National Harrow.67 For 
example, National Harrow sued Hench after his licenses was declared void.68 Morever, Strait 
                                                
65  This was particularly so after Congress reduced tariffs in 1894. Sheldon D. Pollack, Origins of the Modern 
Income Tax, 1894–1913, 66 THE TAX LAW. 295, 306 (2013). The Tariff Act of 1890 had assigned a forty-five 
percent duty to imported harrows, insulating the domestic market from any foreign competition. See Editorial, The 
Harrow Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1895, at 4. In April 1893, the harrow manufacturers then controlling National 
Harrow claimed that the tariff would not impact the profits of the Standard Harrow Company, a newly incorporated 
company that organizers intended to acquire the stock of National Harrow (which did not come about after the panic 
of 1893). Editorial, The Plaint of the Harrow Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1894, at 4. Although a New York court in 
1891 recognized the Harrow Trust as such, the Republican party sought to deny its existence, “just as they have 
denied the existence of almost every other similar combination devised by protected manufactures whose purpose 
was to take all possible advantage of consumers under the high tariff duties, which they have used . . . as 
‘instruments of greed.’” Id. In support of his desire to lower tariffs to quell the rising tide of trusts, Senator Vest 
entered into the record an examination of one hundred trusts then existing in the United States. 23 CONG. REC. 
5538–57 (1892). Senator Vest told Congress that no one knew about the Harrow Trust until the Strait case in New 
York, yet it was the “superiority” of the float spring-tooth harrow that had driven nearly any other kind out of the 
market. Id. at 5545. The manufacturers of harrows admitted that they were sold domestically at about ten percent 
more than the foreign trade. Id. Not coincidentally, Senator Vest, a Democrat from Missouri, had contributed to 
drafting and enacting the Sherman Act just two years earlier. See Barak Orbach, Symposium: The Goals of Antitrust: 
How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2260 (2013). This concern with tariffs contributing to the 
trusts was front and center in the world of harrow manufacturing. See Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1894, at 4. 
Once the Revenue Act of 1894 moved through Congress for enactment, the harrow manufacturers joined to oppose 
the bill, which they believed would leave domestic manufacturers with exposure to loss of sales to foreign 
corporations. Id. The New York Times reported that National Harrow had many suits pending during this time, 
presumably to continue to dominate the market for harrows using patent litigation rather than relying on a protective 
tariff. Editorial, The Harrow Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1895, at 4.  
 
66  See E. Bement’s Sons, Behold How Plain a Tale Shall Put Them Down, FARM IMPLEMENT NEWS, July 14, 
1898, at 20–21. In an advertisement listing in detail suits against its customers as well as suits against other 
manufacturers, Bement describes National Harrow’s warnings and threats of suit as “a malicious misrepresentation 
of facts, and was not intended as a warning in good faith to dealers, but simply as a bugaboo to terrify.” Id. at 20. 
 
67  Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Hanby, 54 F. 493, 493 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1893); Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 F. 130, 
130 (C.C.D. Ind. 1895), aff’d on other grounds, 74 F. 236 (7th Cir. 1896); Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Hench, 84 F. 226, 
226 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1898); Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Wescott, 84 F. 670, 670 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1898). 
 




succeeded in invalidating the patent in suit,69 whereas Hench won its suit when the court 
determined that the assignment of the patents to National Harrow must be declared void if the 
licenses given in consideration also were void.70 National Harrow also sued a dealer of Strait’s 
harrows, James Hanby, but the court found no infringement.71 Because the harrow field was 
“crowded when these patentees entered it,” the patent claim at issue must be construed quite 
narrowly; as a result, “when so construed the defendant does not infringe.”72 The only other 
reported case involving infringement found in favor of National Harrow over a dealer selling 
harrows made by Hench.73  
                                                
69  U.S. Patent No. 388,306 (issued Aug. 21, 1888). Soon after the New York court declared the licenses void 
in January 1891, Strait sued National Harrow seeking to enjoin it from bringing an infringement suit. Strait v. Nat’l 
Harrow Co., 51 F. 819, 819 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1892); see Decisions Relating to Patents, 68 SCI. AM. 178, 183 (1893). 
The court refused to deprive National Harrow of its legal right to bring suit for patent infringement, despite the 
previous decision that the licenses were unlawful restraints in trade. Strait, 51 F. at 820. Indeed, according to the 
court, it would be 
 
impertinent [to inquire into the character of the combination] as one in respect to the moral 
character or antecedents of the plaintiff in an ordinary suit for trespass upon his property. Even a 
gambler, or the keeper of a brothel, cannot be deprived of his property because he is an obnoxious 
person or a criminal; and it is no defense to the trespass upon it, unless it was removed or 
destroyed in the suppression of a nuisance, that it was used in carrying on the unlawful 
occupation. 
 
Id. at 820–21 (citing Ely v. Bd. of Supervisors, 36 N.Y. 297, 300 (1867)); see The Principle Was Old, FARM 
IMPLEMENT NEWS, Mar. 16, 1893, at 27 (“Clipper . . . have won in a skirmish with the National Harrow Company . . 
. . The court held that the principle involved was old at the date of application.”). There are conflicting reports about 
Clipper Chilled being in or out of the trust during 1891 and 1892. The Chicago Tribune reported that the litigations 
had all been settled as of February 28, 1891. In Control of the Harrow Business: The National Company Will Run 
Things Its Own Way, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 1891, at 1. Yet in December 1892, Strait wrote an opinion piece in Farm 
Implement News decrying the trust. Strait, supra note 28, at 16. 
 
70  Hench, 84 F. at 227. The nullification of the licenses in Pennsylvania rendered the patent assignments 
unenforceable as well. As the court noted, “To place any other interpretation upon the [Pennsylvania] decision is to 
make it a mere brutum fulmen leading to results so illogical and inequitable as to border on the grotesque.” Id. 
 
71  Hanby, 54 F. at 494. 
 
72  Id. 
 
73  Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Westcott, 84 F. 673, 674 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1898) (finding the Davis patent valid and 
infringed). But see Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Westcott, 84 F. 670, 671 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.1898) (finding West & Chase 
patents valid and not infringed); Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Westcott, 84 F. 671, 673 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1898) (finding Cobb 
patent invalid for lack of invention). Hench rejoined the trust sometime in or around 1898. The National Harrow 
Company, FARM IMPLEMENT NEWS, Mar. 24, 1898, at 9. National Harrow used this 1898 victory against Westcott 
13 
 
The remaining reported cases featured parties outside of the trust who found themselves 
losing customers or dealers due to the trust’s threats.74 Typically, National Harrow widely 
circulated letters announcing that National Harrow’s patents had been sustained in the courts, 
that certain manufacturers (and, by extension, his customers and dealers) infringed certain 
patents, and that unless those dealers and customers ceased carrying the alleged infringer’s 
harrows, National Harrow would bring suit.75 The company warned that this would subject their 
customers or dealers to high costs because allegedly infringing manufacturers so often lacked 
financial responsibility.76  
When the trust sued Quick & Lindahl, a harrow dealer in Chesterton, Indiana, for patent 
infringement in 1895, the defendant countered that National Harrow should be declared illegal as 
a common law restraint in trade.77 The district court agreed, stating carefully,  
                                                                                                                                                       
and Hench’s harrows to threaten future suits against still more manufacturers, dealers, and even customers if they 
did not heed the trust’s warnings about manufacturing and selling unlicensed harrows. Id. In an advertisement 
directed to dealers, National Harrow described favorable resolution of Hench matter and invited dealers to report on 
others selling unlicensed harrows. Id. National Harrow also called out specific Eureka Mower Company and Bement 
harrow models as unlicensed and infringing, warning, “We shall continue in like manner to prosecute all infringers.” 
To Buyers and Users of Spring Tooth Harrows, FARM IMPLEMENT NEWS, June 9, 1898, at 27. Another group of 
cases, unreported, claimed infringement by dealers of harrows made by licensee Eureka Mower Company (and its 
subsidiary Davison Harrow Company). Id.; see Davison v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 103 F. 360, 362 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1900) 
(describing pending suits in New York as appropriate vehicles for determining whether National Harrow’s 
infringement claims in advertisements were libelous or true); A Patent Decision, FARM IMPLEMENTS, Mar. 27, 1900, 
at 24. A test case brought in Michigan dismissed National Harrow’s infringement claim against Davison that might 
impact pending “suits . . . reaching nearly the hundred mark” against Eureka and Davison’s customers. Id.  
 
74  Davison, 103 F. at 360; A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 99 F. 160, 161 (C.C.D.N.J.) rev’d, 102 F. 
714 (3d Cir. 1900). 
 
75  To Buyers and Users of Spring Tooth Harrows, supra note 73. 
 
76  A.B. Farquhar Co., 99 F. at 161. For example, North Molitor sued National Harrow after it publicized its 
judgment against Bement, alleging damage from the accusations made by National Harrow that North Molitor’s 
connections with Bement suggested it would be ruined by National Harrow’s win. The Spring-Tooth Harrow 
Warfare, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1895, at 19. 
 
77  Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 F. 130, 130 (C.C.D. Ind. 1895) aff’d on other grounds, 74 F. 236 (7th Cir. 
1896); An Important Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1895, at 4. Referring to the Indiana court decision, the New 
York Times wrote, “[T]he purpose of the plaintiff corporation and combination had been to become the assignee of 
all the harrow patents held by manufacturers of harrows; to license these manufacturers on payment by them of a 
14 
 
The common law forbids the organization of such combinations, composed of 
numerous corporations and firms. They are dangerous to the peace and good order 
of society, and they arrogate to themselves the exercise of powers destructive of 
the right of free competition in the markets of the country, and, by their aggregate 
power and influence, imperil the free and pure administration of justice.78  
  
Although National Harrow claimed that a valid patent entitled it to protection from 
infringement by anyone, the court declined to “lend the countenance of the court to the creation 
of combinations, trusts, or monopolies.”79 The Indiana court also held that the defendant’s 
harrow did not infringe the patent in suit; it practiced a different, non-infringing patent.80 On 
appeal, a Seventh Circuit panel affirmed the decision on the grounds of non-infringement by way 
of invalidating the Reed patent, without considering whether the combination’s agreements ran 
afoul of the common law’s refusal.81 
A. B. Farquhar (another affiliate of Hench & Dromgold) sued National Harrow and 
requested that the company be enjoined from  
circulating among complainant’s customers and agents letters by which they are 
falsely and maliciously informed that the defendant’s patents have been sustained 
by the courts, that the complainant’s harrows are infringements thereon, and that, 
unless they desist from handling and selling the same, suits will be brought by 
defendant against them . . . .82  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
royalty; to take charge of all litigation, and to fix the price at which the harrows should be sold.” Id.; see Judge 
Baker on Trusts, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 1895, at 6 (discussing the Quick case). 
 
78  Quick, 67 F. at 131 (citing Strait v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 18 N.Y.S. 224, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891)). 
 
79  Id. at 132 (“The common law does not prohibit the making of such combinations. It merely declines, after 
they have been made, to recognize their validity, by refusing to make any decree or order which will in any way give 
aid to the purposes of such combinations.”). 
 
80  Id. at 134. 
 
81  Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Quick, 74 F. 236, 240 (7th Cir. 1896) (“[W]e are clear that this patent is void of 
invention, and on that ground the decree below is affirmed.”). At this time, patents were invalidated on a circuit-by-
circuit basis. Not until 1972 was issue preclusion held to apply to invalidate patents across all jurisdictions. Blonder-
Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971). 
 




The district court dismissed the case on demurrer—holding that any price controls or 
competition suppression would be “immaterial” to the question of patent infringement, if true.83 
The court described the patent owner as having every right to “us[e] all lawful means to protect 
his monopoly.”84 The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal on demurrer, and allowed the suit to 
proceed with the plaintiff’s allegations.85 The circuit court acknowledged that it agreed with the 
lower court’s assessment of a patent as a monopoly, but also questioned whether the notices had 
been given in bad faith to destroy the business of another, in which case a court should not refuse 
to step in to protect against “property rights being fraudulently assailed.”86  
When another infringement defendant, a dealer of harrows made by licensee Eureka 
Grower Company, sought a preliminary injunction against National Harrow to cease distributing 
inflammatory circulars, the court described the company’s activity in less than flattering terms, 
accusing National Harrow of “barking” as well as “biting” such that its conduct was “fast 
reaching the point . . . where its conduct may be deemed unnecessarily harsh and oppressive.”87 
                                                
83  Id. 
 
84  Id.  
 
85  A.B. Farquhar Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 102 F. 714, 715 (3d Cir. 1900). 
 
86  Id. (citing Emack v. Kane, 34 F. 46, 52 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1888)). 
 
87  Davison v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 103 F. 360, 361 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1900). The court described National 
Harrow’s activity in vivid terms:  
 
On previous occasions they have shown some little familiarity with the art of advertising, but 
never before have they been so perniciously active as during the past few months. Not only have 
they kept up a well sustained system of ‘barking,’ but they have done some ‘biting’ as well, in the 
form of suits against 9 or 10 alleged infringers of one of the defendant’s patents. The circulars and 
letters, which, at the time this action was commenced, were descending upon the farmers from a 
seemingly inexhaustible supply are all, substantially, of the same purport. They contain an 
assertion that the Davison harrow infringes the defendant’s patents and particularly the patent 
granted to Reed and Clark. Dealers who purchase the Davison harrow are threatened with 
prosecution. A list of those against whom suits have been commenced is given and also a list of 
defendant’s licensees with a statement that harrows can be bought of them which are free from any 
charge of infringement. One of the complainants’ customers has received 13 of these warnings, 
and that substantial duplicates of the same notice have been sent again and again to the same 
16 
 
Yet, the court did not issue an injunction (distinguishing the demurrer) and pushed the parties to 
calmly await the outcome of the infringement suit.88 
Similarly, Adriance, Platt & Company, a manufacturer not in the trust, brought suit 
against National Harrow for libel after an allegation of infringement.89 When confronted by 
Adriance, who requested that it bring an infringement suit to settle the question, National Harrow 
allegedly replied “that it proposed to prevent the complainant from building harrows in its own 
way.”90 Although the lower court found that “the defendant was acting within its rights, and that 
the letters and circulars were legitimate notices to infringers of these rights,”91 the Second Circuit 
held that bad faith permeated the case—the purpose was to intimidate customers and coerce 
Adriance into taking a license—and enjoined National Harrow from harassing conduct.92  
                                                                                                                                                       
persons is not disputed. Although it would seem that the defendant is fast reaching the point, if 
indeed it has not already reached it, where its conduct may be deemed unnecessarily harsh and 
oppressive, the court should hesitate to interfere by injunction so long as there remains a 
reasonable doubt as to the propriety of such a course. In these causes the court is embarking, with 
only a crude chart, upon a newly-discovered sea filled with rocks and dangerous shoals, and 




88  Id. at 362. 
 
89  Adriance, Platt & Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 121 F. 827, 828 (2d Cir. 1903). 
 
90  See Adriance, Platt & Co. v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 111 F. 637, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1901), rev’d, 121 F. 827, 829 
(2d Cir. 1903). The circulars from National Harrow stated, “We have yet to find a harrow of recent and modern 
construction that does not embody one or more of our patents . . . [w]e regret that we are obliged to hold the dealers 
responsible, but this cannot be avoided, as in many cases the manufacturers would not be able to settle our claims.” 
Id. at 829.  
 
91  Id. 
 
92  Id. at 831. The publicity of Adriance’s suit caused National Harrow to bring several actions against the 
customers of Adriance; those suits were voluntarily dismissed. Id. at 830–31. The court remarked, “The inglorious 
conclusion of these suits may afford an explanation of the defendant’s reasons for preferring to attack the 
complainant by the circulars and letters rather than in a court of justice.” Id. at 831. Later, when the accounting 
awarded to Adriance in this litigation made Adriance National Harrow’s only creditor in bankruptcy, the parties 
settled by giving Adriance ownership of all of the company’s assets, including the patents and all claims for 




In sum, as National Harrow used litigation and threats to protect its market share and 
combination,93 these early wins of licensees and others suggested that the trust was not long for 
the world, especially given an inevitable showdown with the new Sherman Act. That changed in 
Bement.94 
II. E. BEMENT & SONS V. NATIONAL HARROW COMPANY 
Bement, a well-known manufacturer of farm implements based in Lansing, Michigan, 
was no stranger to patent and contract litigation related to its harrow business.95 Prior to National 
Harrow’s incorporation, Bement defended itself and its dealers in patent suits brought by Reed 
and others.96 Bement also had been sued for unpaid royalties from a non-exclusive license from 
Garver in 1888, a case that Bement won.97 
When Bement agreed to join the recently incorporated National Harrow in September 
1890, its portion of capital stock in the company was to be determined based on the value of its 
                                                
93  Adriance, Platt & Co., 121 F. at 830 (“Until the present action was brought, the defendant contented itself 
with warnings and threats to the complainant’s customers, and made no attempt to prosecute an infringement suit.”). 
 
 
94  Compare id. at 831 (“We conclude that complainant was entitled to an injunction and an accounting.”), 
with Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 95 (“[W]e hold that the agreements A and B actually entered into 
were not a violation of the act.”). 
 
95  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 234. 
 
96  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 234. At Bement’s trial, Arthur Bement testified that D.C. & H.C. 
Reed & Co. brought some “six to a dozen” patent infringement suits against Bement’s customers and dealers before 
September 12, 1890, and that Bement appeared on behalf of those customers in defense. See Transcript of Record, 
supra note 36, at 234. Following the decision in Reed v. Smith narrowing the Reed patent but enjoining the Bement 
harrow as infringing, Bement published a favorable portion of the decision in a trade circular and threatened 
infringement suits against Big Six customers in a two-to-one ratio for suits filed against Bement customers on the 
Reed patent. See 40 F. 882, 887 (E.D. Mich. 1890); Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 234–35. Bement 
admitted that no suits had been brought against customers on the Paddock patent—only against one Big Six 
manufacturer, Olin & Co. Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 235. 
 
97  See Garver v. Bement, 37 N.W. 63, 65–66 (Mich. 1888). Bement won, in part, based on its position that a 
lawful termination of the agreement had enabled the company to switch to a non-infringing harrow tooth 




exclusive license of patents owned by Charles La Dow.98 The La Dow license, signed in 1889, 
allowed Bement to manufacture and sell a type of harrow known in the trade as the “Steel 
King.”99 During their negotiations, La Dow assured Arthur Bement that “if [Bement] took the 
license [they] would have this field entirely to themselves so far as the [claimed features of the 
Steel King harrow] . . . were concerned.”100 But National Harrow’s attorneys were not so 
convinced—they sent a letter to Bement in December 1890 describing the La Dow patents as 
worthless.101 
At the National Harrow inaugural annual meeting in June 1891, Bement finally executed 
the company’s form patent assignment and license agreements,102 but uncertainty about the value 
of the La Dow licenses became a point of contention for allocating capital stock.103 National 
Harrow, believing the patents to be invalid, called upon Bement to rescind the La Dow license.104 
Bement insisted that the contracts were very valuable.105 The arbitrator sided with Bement and 
                                                
98  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 354. 
 
99  E. Bement & Sons v. La Dow, 66 F. 185, 186 (1895). 
 
100  Id. at 188. 
 
101  See id. at 196. 
 
102  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 354. By then, the agreements had all been revised to terminate upon 
the expiration of the patent to avoid the restraint in trade problems identified by the court in Strait. See Strait v. Nat’l 
Harrow Co., 18 N.Y.S. 224, 233–34 (Sup. Ct. 1891).  
 
103  See La Dow, 66 F. at 196. In its contracts with manufacturers, National Harrow agreed to issue paid-up 
stock in the corporation to them in exchange for their assignment of rights, to be agreed upon or settled by 
arbitration. See also Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 47. 
 
104  See La Dow, 66 F. at 196. 
 




awarded it $29,200 in National Harrow capital stock.106 This was later adjusted upward to 
$45,200, and the La Dow licenses were assumed by National Harrow.107 
When La Dow sued Bement for unpaid royalties in 1891, Bement raised a fraud defense 
based upon the allegedly false statements made by La Dow regarding the exclusivity of the field 
that Bement would enjoy.108 However, because Bement had sold its harrow rights, including its 
contracts with La Dow, to National Harrow, the court held that Bement could not rescind the 
contract on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation.109 After this suit, Bement assumed full 
responsibility back from National Harrow for the contracts with La Dow “to preserve peace and 
harmony.”110 Bement sued La Dow directly to rescind the licenses, again based on fraudulent 
misrepresentation.111 In March 1895, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
New York declared the licenses valid and held that Bement owed royalties to La Dow—having 
enjoyed the benefit of the licenses for five years and having full knowledge about the uncertainty 
regarding value of the La Dow patents, Bement had ratified the La Dow contracts.112  
In the meantime, the harrow industry was moving from the standard float spring tooth 
harrows, upon which the teeth were fixed or adjustable at the harrow frame, to harrows with a 
                                                
106  See id. at 197. 
 
107  See id. 
 
108  See id. 
 
109  See La Dow, 66 F. at 197.  
 
110  See id.; Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 354.  
 
111  See La Dow, 66 F. at 197. It is clear that the La Dow agreements, which carried a royalty on every Steel 
King harrow sold, made the National Harrow price schedule more onerous to Bement than to manufactures who 
were not paying additional royalties outside of the trust. See id. at 193 (describing the La Dow contracts as less 
valuable when Bement joined National Harrow). 
 




lever attachment that allowed for adjustment simultaneously.113 National Harrow acquired the 
patent rights to the lever attachment in October 1891 and sued at least two licensees for 
infringement.114 By November 1892, National Harrow had voted to license lever harrows to all 
then existing licensees, on the same terms as their existing licenses, and had approved such 
models for licensing by each licensee.115 Bement and North Molitor never signed these new lever 
harrow licenses.116  
Bement stopped paying royalties to National Harrow in September 1893 but continued to 
sell a number of harrows upon which it had previously reported royalties.117 The question of 
whether these harrows (with lever attachments) fell within the original license agreements 
executed in 1891 consumed much of the Bement trial after National Harrow sued Bement in New 
York state court in late 1894 seeking to recover contract damages based on allegations of price 
cutting on Steel King harrows and selling unlicensed harrows.118 A trade paper reported in 
March 1895 that “war [had] been declared between” Bement and National Harrow.119  
                                                
113  See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 248. The first lever attachment patent issued in 1890 and most 
of the licensees with National Harrow did not hear about it until the fall 1892 or spring 1893. See Transcript of 
Record, supra note 36, at 105, 248. From then on, about sixty to ninety percent of the harrows sold had levers. See 
Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 175. 
 
114  Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 105–06. 
 
115  See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 105. 
 
116  See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 105. 
 
117  See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 254. 
 
118  Nat’l Harrow Co. v. E. Bement & Sons, 47 N.Y.S. 462, 463 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897), rev’d, 57 N.E. 764 
(N.Y. 1900), aff’d, 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
 
119  Trade News, FARM IMPLEMENT NEWS, Mar. 28, 1895, at 20. National Harrow had also sued dealers of 
North Molitor Manufacturing Co., “a branch of the Bement concern,” which caused North Molitor, in its own right, 
to sue National Harrow in 1895 to invalidate its contracts with National Harrow and to enjoin it from bringing 




After considering a great deal of evidence on prices, naming conventions of different 
types of harrows,120 harrow technology in general, and the corporate organization of National 
Harrow, in June 1895, the referee sided with National Harrow in the contract case, awarding 
almost $21,000 in damages to the company and ordering Bement to specifically perform its 
obligations under the agreements.121 The referee declared National Harrow not a trust and 
described its contracts with its licensees as valid and enforceable.122 Referring to the decision, 
The New York Times declared, “The life of the National Harrow [Co.], which now controls 
nearly every harrow factor in the country, depends upon this suit.”123 An upstate New York 
newspaper explained, “[T]he National Harrow Company had several hundred suits pending 
against parties using unlicensed harrows, which will be seriously affected, if not absolutely 
determined, by the effect of this judgment.”124 
Bement appealed to the New York appellate division, which reversed the decision and 
granted a new trial to the parties.125 After explaining how harrow manufacturers formed National 
Harrow in 1890 and outlining the provisions in the agreements between National Harrow and 
                                                
120  Bement’s main argument in the royalties case was that the harrows it sold did not fall within the existing 
license agreements for float spring tooth harrows, based upon a new round of license agreements, not signed by 
Bement, for lever spring tooth harrows. See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 153–54. 
 
121  Nat’l Harrow Co., 47 N.Y.S. at 463. 
 
122  Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 85 (1902). 
 
123  National Harrow Company Not a Trust, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1895, at 24. On July 6, 1895, Molitor sued 
National Harrow for damages arising from the libelous statements. The Spring-Tooth Harrow Warfare, supra note 
76. Desperate to maintain its market domination, National Harrow again publicized the judgment and singled out the 
North Molitor Manufacturing Co., a company described as “connected with the Bement concern.” To Buyers and 
Users of Spring Tooth Harrows, supra note 73. Bement fought back with its own biting advertisement. To Dealers 
in Spring-Tooth Harrows: Warning! Warning!, FARM IMPLEMENT NEWS, Dec. 8, 1898, at 11 (cautioning dealers 
about infringement of Bement patents). 
 
124  The Harrow Suits, DEMOCRAT & CHRON., June 7, 1895, at 1 (“[S]ettl[ing] the controversy” . . . [and] 
“dispos[ing] of the question of ‘public policy’ in favor of the [National Harrow Company].”). 
 




Bement, the appellate court declared the contract provisions that fixed the prices at which 
licensees could sell harrows and that limited manufacturers to selling only those harrows 
authorized in their individual contracts “void as against public policy.”126 The court explained, 
“These provisions not only stifle competition between the plaintiff's licensees, but effectually 
prevent them from attempting to make any improvement in harrows.”127 Moreover, the court also 
considered the agreements under New York’s Stock Corporation law, which both prohibited and 
abolished “the creation of a monopoly or the unlawful restraint of trade or for the prevention of 
competition in any necessary of life.”128 Harrows were an important and necessary farm 
implement—these agreements could not be enforceable, the court continued.129 
National Harrow, like it had in earlier cases, argued that patents enabled patent owners or 
their assignees to enter into agreements that restricted production or fixed the prices of patented 
articles sold without concern for running afoul of competition law.130 In response, the Court 
recognized the property right of patents, which are “subject, as is all other property to the general 
law of the land,”131 but a patent license agreement, like all other contracts, must be “subject to 
the limitations imposed by definite principles of public policy.”132 Using this private law 
framework, the court found the contracts contrary to public policy precisely because they 
                                                
126  Id. at 463–66. 
 
127  Id. at 466. 
 
128  Id. at 467 (quoting Law of May 7, 1897, ch. 384, § 7, 1897 N.Y. Laws 313). The court stated, “A harrow is 
an implement as important as generally used by farmers as a plow, and is quite necessary for the proper cultivation 
of land as any other agricultural implement, and is in use on every properly cultivated farm.” Id. 
 
129  Nat’l Harrow Co., 47 N.Y.S. at 467. 
 
130  Id. at 467–68. 
 
131  Id. at 468 (quoting Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 293 (6th Cir. 
1896)). 
 




extended for the life of the patents, they controlled prices for a long period of time, and none of 
the licensees in the pool could capitalize on any improvements made during the license term.133  
National Harrow appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed again, not 
on the merits but on procedure.134 The intermediate court’s opinion below had not made clear 
that it reversed on the facts, leaving the appellate court to assume that the reversal was made on 
an error of law.135 The appellate court could not find an error of law stated in the lower court’s 
decision to reverse the referee.136 As such, New York law prohibited the intermediate court from 
reversing the decision below.137 The Court of Appeals’ refusal to consider the substantive 
question left the referee’s decision in favor of National Harrow in place.138 
Bement appealed to the United States Supreme Court on writ of error by the New York 
Court of Appeals.139 Writing for the entire Court, Justice Peckham first noted the Court’s 
jurisdiction based upon new federal antitrust laws (a question raised by National Harrow).140 One 
                                                
133  Id. at 468. The court referred to the Hench, Quick, and Strait cases decided against National Harrow as 
confirming this view. Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 F. 130, 131 (C.C.D. Ind. 1895); Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Hench, 76 
F. 667, 669–70 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1896); Strait v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 18 N.Y.S. 224, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891).  
 
134  Nat’l Harrow Co. v. E. Bement & Sons, 57 N.E. 764, 764 (N.Y. 1900). 
 
135  Id. at 768. 
 
136  Id. 
 
137  Id. at 767–68. 
 
138  Id. at 768; but see Nat’l Harrow Co., 57 N.E. at 768 (Cullen, J., dissenting) (“In my opinion, the defendant 
conclusively proved by uncontroverted evidence that the two agreements declared on by the plaintiff were made in 
pursuance of the prior agreement referred to in the answer, and the written instruments, construed together, show an 
illegal combination. This was so held in [Quick and Hench]. In the views expressed in those cases I entirely concur, 
but it would be unprofitable to pursue the discussion in this respect, as the majority of the court hold that we cannot 
look into the record to see if the defendant has conclusively proved its defense, but are confined to the inquiry 
whether the facts found by the referee in his decision have the support of evidence, and, if there is evidence to 
sustain them, whether they authorize the judgment rendered. From this view of the practice and the power of the 
court I am constrained to dissent.”). 
 
139  See Transcript of Record, supra note 36, at 1. 
 
140  Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S 70, 83 (1902). 
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of the questions presented to the appellate court in New York was “[w]hether or not the 
[National Harrow] contracts . . . are valid under the [Sherman Act],” which was “the only 
Federal question raised and appearing in the record.”141 As such, the Supreme Court could decide 
that federal question, regardless of any action by the state courts below.142  
Next, the Court had to determine whether a contract defendant like Bement could raise 
the Sherman Act in defense to a state contract action in the first place (a question of first 
impression).143 National Harrow contended that Bement could not bring suit against National 
Harrow for liability under the Sherman Act, which specifies by statute that only the Attorney 
General of the United States or a person injured in his business or property by the 
anticompetitive conduct in question can bring suits.144 But as an entity sued upon the contract, 
the Court held, Bement could plead in defense that the contracts in question violate the statute, 
“and if found to be so, that fact will constitute a good defense to the action.”145 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
141  Id. at 82 (syllabus). 
 
142  Id. at 83. 
 
143  Id. at 87–88; see Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77 (1982) (“There is no statutory code of 
federal contract law, but our cases leave no doubt that illegal promises will not be enforced in cases controlled by 
the federal law.”). 
 
144  Bement, 186 U.S at 88. The relevant statute provided, “[I]t shall be the duty of the several United States 
attorneys . . . under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain 
such violations . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)).  
 
[W]hen the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such petition the court shall 
proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case. . . . Whenever it shall 
appear to the court before which any proceeding under section 4 of this title may be pending, that 
the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may 
cause them to be summoned . . . and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the 
marshal thereof. 
 
15 U.S.C. §§ 4–5 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4–5 (2012)). 
 




Finally, the Court turned to that substantive question—did the contracts in question 
violate the prohibitions found in the statute?146 That the agreements concern patents, the Court 
stated, is the “most material fact in considering this question.”147 Previous decisions “impressed 
upon [the patent] all the qualities and characteristics of property . . . and has enabled him to hold 
and deal with it the same as in case of any other description of property belonging to him . . . 
.”148 Although the patent grant is made on the “reasonable expectation that he will either put his 
invention to practical use or permit others to avail themselves of it upon reasonable terms,” the 
public has retained no ability to enforce those expectations.149 As a general matter, a patent 
owner has the “absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United 
States,” subject to general public policy principles or the state police powers.150 The Court 
concluded 
that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this 
kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the 
right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts. The 
fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices does 
not render them illegal.151 
 
Having set out that such contracts were not presumptively illegal (yet also not 
presumptively legal), the Bement Court construed the statute to preclude its application to 
restraints that “may arise from reasonable and legal conditions imposed upon the assignee or 
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licensee of a patent by the owner thereof, restricting the terms upon which the article may be 
used and the price to be demanded therefor.”152 The Court acknowledged that created some 
tension with previous cases holding that “the [Sherman Act] included any restraint of commerce, 
whether reasonable or unreasonable,” but Congress surely had not contemplated a construction 
that would prohibit agreements by patent owners to exploit their exclusive patent rights.153  
Reviewing the agreements in question between National Harrow and Bement through this 
lens, the Court failed to find any violations of the Sherman Act.154 The Big Six had resolved a 
large amount of litigation by forming National Harrow, which the Court described as “a 
legitimate and desirable result in itself.”155 The provision in the agreements keeping prices up in 
the licensed harrows merely “recognize[d] the nature of the property dealt in, and providing for 
its value so far as possible.”156 The patent owner can charge whatever price he chooses when he 
sells a patented article—it followed that the patent owner can require, by agreement, a licensee 
or assignee to charge a specified price.157 With respect to the limitation on licensees 
manufacturing only those goods that it was making and selling prior to entering into the 
agreement with National Harrow, the Court found that these agreements did not stifle 
competition or prevent improvements in any manner more than the patents would have on their 
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own.158 The Court read the agreement to allow Bement and the other licensees explicitly to use 
any patents that they might obtain otherwise (provided they were not infringing the patents of 
others).159 Closing, the Court found nothing in the provisions, taken together or separately in the 
agreements between National Harrow and Bement, that would render the contracts void under 
the Sherman Act.160  
Importantly, the Court did not consider any agreements between National Harrow and 
other harrow manufacturers apart from Bement.161 The referee, in the first instance, had not 
found from the evidence that the agreements identical to those with Bement had been found void 
in other jurisdictions, that other harrow manufacturers had entered into the same contracts, nor 
that “there was a general combination among the dealers in patented harrows to regulate the sale 
and prices of such harrows.”162 The Court could not assume facts not in evidence.163 The referee 
concluded that the contracts between National Harrow and Bement were 
legal, valid, and binding contracts, and such as might reasonably be made under 
the circumstances, and were founded upon a good, valuable, and adequate 
consideration, and were reasonable in their provisions, and that they embodied no 
illegal restraints, and were not repugnant to any rule of public policy as in 
restraint of trade, and were not intended to create a monopoly, trust, or illegal 
combination . . . .164  
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No doubt, the referee’s opinion on this matter and its limited findings on the record below 
frustrated any desire the Court may have had to expand its opinion to take into account the 
conduct of National Harrow at any level other than just the agreements with Bement.165  
The sweeping language of this relatively narrow contracts case influenced turn of the 
century patent and antitrust cases outside of the Harrow Trust context.166 One contemporary 
author described the case as “strengthe[ning] the tendency to secure monopolistic control on the 
basis of patent right.”167 The following Part describes Bement’s reception and modern doctrinal 
threads, the ways in which it has been forgotten, and the ways in which it may be useful to 
examine modern cases.  
III. REVIVING BEMENT FOR THE MODERN AGE 
 
The skirmish in Bement, with its rich facts and complex economics, ends with the patent 
owner victorious over a defecting licensee on a contract claim because the Court refused to 
consider the other identical assignments and licenses entered into by National Harrow, acting as 
a patent pool, in its attempt to obtain control over the entire harrow market.168 By all lights, 
Bement should be a well circumscribed case in both fields of patent and antitrust law, given this 
contractual claim with a narrow federal defense joined with a limited record and publicly 
litigated facts ignored by the Court in its resolution. Curiously, then, courts in the early twentieth 
century looked upon Bement as establishing that patent agreements would be immune from 
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antitrust scrutiny.169 This early embrace of Bement far beyond the confines of its own facts could 
not be sustained.170 As the mid-century Supreme Court strengthened its interventionist approach 
to horizontal agreements, a mere sliver of precedent remained of licensee price restrictions.171 In 
the modern age, Bement’s embrace of patent monopolies lends itself to rote recitation by 
advocates, but the case has otherwise been forgotten as important precedent in either patent or 
antitrust law.172  
A. Early Days: A Patent Pool Origins Story 
 
Two cases from the early twentieth century capture how broadly courts interpreted 
Bement to approve of patent pooling agreements, including price and output restrictions, as per 
se legal instruments.173 The Ninth Circuit, considering a very similar contracts case involving the 
Seeded Raisin Trust, held that contracts involving patents were “not void as against public 
policy, as tending to create a monopoly, or as obnoxious to the provisions of the Sherman anti-
trust act.”174 Arriving at this conclusion, the court recounted the facts of Bement in detail and 
held in favor of the patent owner on Bement’s principles alone.175 The cases were identical in 
some respects—both involved patent pools formed to avoid injurious patent litigations—but the 
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seeded raisin agreements did not fix prices for the licensees as was done in the harrow 
agreements.176  
Elsewhere, the Seventh Circuit, considering a contracts case involving the Rubber Tire 
Trust, acknowledged that Bement did not weigh in on the legality of pooling groups of patent 
licensees and setting price schedules, as done by National Harrow and others.177 It carefully 
noted that it could only consider the facts in its record.178 The Seventh Circuit conducted its own 
analysis of the arrangement in the Rubber Tire case and determined that it was lawful under the 
Sherman Act—“None of the provisions of the contract . . . touched any matter outside of the 
monopoly under the patent.”179 Controlling price and output could not deprive the public of 
anything—these “internal agreements relating to royalties, proportioning the business, 
supervision, and penalties, did not affect or concern the public at all.”180 The Seventh Circuit 
dismissed any complex interaction between patent law and antitrust law:  
The Sherman law contains no reference to the patent law. Each was passed under 
a separate and distinct constitutional grant of power . . . to advantage the public . . 
. the necessary implication is that patented articles, unless or until they are 
released by the owner of the patent from the dominion of his monopoly, are not 
articles of trade or commerce among the several states.181  
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Accordingly, an early impact of Bement was to fix courts on the idea of patent and 
antitrust law as separate spheres, where the new Sherman Act would not regulate any agreement 
that belonged exclusively to patent law (in other words, any agreement that did not exceed the 
boundaries of a patent owner’s exclusive rights to use, make, and sell the invention).182 Bement, 
of course, did not go so far, but this view of patent immunity from antitrust liability persisted 
until at least 1912 in the Supreme Court.183 
B. The Progressive Antitrust Era 
 
By 1912, public sentiment in the United States had come to a consensus that antitrust law 
needed to play some role in regulating the trusts that emerged in the late nineteenth century, 
including those involving patent licenses.184 Bement, the Court’s only precedent with regard to 
the latter, was featured in two prominent cases that year: Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.185 and United 
States v. Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co.186 In the former, the Court used Bement to 
support its holding that a tying restriction placed upon a patented article could be enforceable as 
a matter of patent law.187 In the latter, the Court distinguished Bement to support its holding that 
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a set of patent pool agreements were condemned by the Sherman Act because they “transcended 
what was necessary to protect the use of the patent or the monopoly which the law conferred 
upon it.”188 Although decided in the same term by the same justices, these cases illustrate the 
difficulty future courts had placing Bement into a neat category.189 
Henry involved a suit for patent infringement brought against a third party seller of 
supplies prohibited by a label license on a mimeograph machine for duplicating.190 The Court 
quoted extensively from Bement, concluding,  
If the stipulation in an agreement between patentees and dealers in 
patented articles, which, among other things, fixed a price below which the 
patented articles should not be sold, would be a reasonable and valid condition 
[according to the Bement Court], it must follow that any other reasonable 
stipulation, not inherently violative of some substantive law, imposed by a 
patentee as part of a sale of a patented machine, would be equally valid and 
enforceable.191  
 
Logically, it should follow that tying restrictions fall into this category. The alleged 
infringer argued that a tying restriction would extend the patent owner’s monopoly into the 
unpatented supplies, but the Court rejected this proposition by explaining that the patent does not 
gain a monopoly in unpatented supplies because all users except the purchaser of the restricted 
devices would be free to use them.192 Essentially, Bement set the stage for finding no Sherman 
Act violation despite the tying arrangement.193 
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The Court went in a different direction in Standard Sanitary.194 There, the Department of 
Justice charged a group of sanitary enameled ironware manufacturers (makers of bathtubs, wash 
bowls, drinking fountains, etc.) with combining to restraint trade under the Sherman Act.195 The 
enameled ironware industry featured one essential patent, owned by Standard Sanitary, which 
initially was unwilling “to confer its utility upon other companies.”196 At some point, a promoter 
convinced the manufacturers of eighty-five percent of the trade to unite in agreements restricting 
price and refusing to allow jobbers to purchase inventory unless they too agreed to the price 
restrictions.197 Despite the defendants’ argument that Bement established that the patent laws and 
the antitrust laws do not affect one another, the Court found the arrangement violated the 
Sherman Act:  
The agreements clearly, therefore, transcended what was necessary to 
protect the use of the patent or the monopoly which the law conferred upon it. 
They passed to the purpose and accomplished a restraint of trade condemned by 
the Sherman law. It had, therefore, a purpose and accomplished a result not shown 
in the Bement Case. There was a contention in that case that the contract of the 
National Harrow Company with Bement & Sons was part of a contract and 
combination with many other companies and constituted a violation of the 
Sherman law, but the fact was not established and the case was treated as one 
between the particular parties, the one granting and the other receiving a right to 
use a patented article with conditions suitable to protect such use and secure its 
benefits.198  
 
In siding with the government, Standard Sanitary established that robust patent rights “do 
not give any more than other rights an universal license against positive prohibitions.”199 As the 
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Court noted, the Sherman Act allows for the restraint of rights “pushed to evil consequences.”200 
The Court acknowledged that Bement was quite a narrow case, turning on only the agreements 
between the parties in the case and not the combination, which did not suggest complete 
immunity from any Sherman Act liability.201 
 When Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.202 overruled 
Henry in 1917, the death knell sounded for the strong view of Bement with respect to price or 
tying restraints.203 Motion Picture Patents Co. held unenforceable a label license on a film 
projector restricting its use to only films produced by the patent owner, allowing for the projector 
owner to supply any films that it liked.204 In 1913, the Court had declared in Bauer & Cie v. 
O’Donnell that price restraints placed directly onto patented articles were unenforceable as 
prohibited price fixing under the Sherman Act.205 Motion Picture Patents Co. similarly 
prohibited tying restrictions, despite having approved of them generally in Henry just five years 
before.206 The majority opinion did not cite Bement, but Justice Holmes’s dissent argues for 
allowing such restrictions as the Court had done in Henry and Bement:  
For fifteen years, at least since [E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co.,] if not 
considerably earlier, the public has been encouraged by this court to believe that 
the law is as it was laid down in [Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. 
Eureka Specialty Co.] [cited favorably by Bement in support of a rule of general 
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freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent law] . . . and numerous other 
decisions of the lower courts.207  
 
 Yet even after Standard Sanitary and Motion Picture Patents, instead of fading into 
complete obscurity, Bement continued to carry some salience through United States v. General 
Electric Co., which was decided in 1926.208 The government sought to enjoin General Electric 
and its licensee, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, from violating the 
Sherman Act with license agreements covering the sale of electric lights with tungsten 
filaments—in the agreements, Westinghouse agreed to sell in accordance with General Electric’s 
prices and terms of sale.209 Thinly distinguishing sales made to purchasers, as had been featured 
in the earlier cases and the agency of the licensee in this case, the Court allowed these price 
restrictions in licenses as outside of the Sherman Act prohibitions: A manufacturing licensee 
owns the material of the patented articles that he makes and can use those articles, but sales may 
infringe the patent owner’s patent but for the license.210  
Sounding very much like Justice Peckham in Bement, the Court held that the patentee 
could place any conditions on the licensee’s ability to sell the patented article, provided “[that 
they] are normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee’s 
monopoly.”211 The Court erroneously refers to Bement as a case about a “combination of 
manufacturers owning a patent . . . [whose restrictions to price and terms were] held to be a valid 
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use of the patent rights of the owners of the patent.”212 Where others argued that Bement had 
been overruled, the Court continued that Motion Pictures Patents Co.  
did not carry with it the overruling of Bement v. Harrow Company . . . . The price 
at which a patented article sells is certainly a circumstance having a more direct 
relation, and is more germane to the rights of the patentee, than the unpatented 
material with which the patented article may be used.213  
 
Cases prohibiting label licenses restricting resale prices did not unravel the authority of 
Bement because a manufacturing licensee only takes the rights given to him by the patent owner, 
even if those rights are limited to specified prices or terms.214 
As the Court entered an era of patent skepticism, Bement became marginalized instead of 
clarified. In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States and United States v. Masonite Corp., the 
Court disregarded or limited the reach of General Electric Co. (and, by extension, Bement).215 In 
Ethyl Gasoline Corp., the Court refused to enforce a license agreement between the patent owner 
and oil refiners that required them to sell ethyl gasoline to only jobbers holding a license from 
the patent owner.216 In Masonite Corp., the Court found illegal a scheme by the patent owner to 
engage with competitors as del credere agents to set price and terms of sale.217 In both of these 
cases, the overall schemes to regulate trade overshadowed price restrictions ostensibly legal 
under General Electric Co. and Bement.218  
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The Court did push back against General Electric Co. and Bement in both United States 
v. U.S. Gypsum Co.219 and United States v. Line Material Co.,220 cases decided on the same day 
in 1948.221 In both cases, the Court struck down a horizontal price-fixing cartel where the patent 
owner licensed his competitors, much as National Harrow had done through a holding company 
controlled by the Big Six.222 Line Material described Bement as establishing patents as an 
exception to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, but price controls also loomed large as “no 
clearer evidence of restraint of trade.”223 Accordingly, “price limitations on patented devices 
beyond the limits of a patent monopoly violate the Sherman Act.”224 General Electric allowed 
for a patent owner to control the price his licensee may charge for the patented article under the 
license, but when two patent owners cross-license competitive patents and “fix prices on all 
devices produced under any of the patents, competition is impeded to a greater degree than 
where a single patentee fixes prices for his licensees.”225 Line Material’s patent owners 
exchanged licenses for blocking patents, which the Court further found anticompetitive and 
prohibited, “as would the fixing of prices between producers of nonpatentable goods.”226  
The Court presents Bement, in each of these cases, as establishing patents as an exception 
to the Sherman Act’s prohibitions of restraints in trade but then narrows that to one on one 
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arrangements, not combinations.227 Any arrangement beyond a licensor fixing prices as to one 
licensee would be unlawful per se under the Sherman Act.228 As a result of these narrowing 
precedents, General Electric may be considered a dead letter today—“deemed an unreliable 
precedent by courts, government enforcers, and practitioners alike”229—but Bement need not be 
forgotten so easily. Instead of being relegated to history volumes, Bement and the curious case of 
the Harrow Trust could be helpful in understanding divided modern cases like FTC v. Actavis, 
Inc.  
C. Actavis’s Rule of Reason 
 
The most recent Supreme Court decision assessing the legality of patent owner conduct 
under antitrust law, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., held that so-called “pay to delay” settlements between 
generic and brand name drug manufacturers are not immune from antitrust scrutiny.230 In his 
majority opinion, Justice Breyer reiterated the generally agreed-upon rule for determining 
antitrust immunity in patent licenses cases—is the agreement within the scope of the patent?231 
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Justice Breyer reviewed the Court’s older cases involving price restraints and settlement 
agreements to define “scope of the patent,” coming to the conclusion that “patent and antitrust 
policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently 
antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”232 Some litigants might settle their patent 
litigation to share monopoly profits and to keep prices high for consumers (which will generally 
be anticompetitive under our antitrust laws), or they might settle to avoid the time and expense of 
a patent litigation (which could be neutral or even pro-competitive).233 Determining whether the 
agreement in question falls within the scope of the patent cannot be the starting point, but a 
conclusion drawn only after assessing all of the circumstances using a rule of reason.234 
Moreover, a district court should be able to figure out whether those circumstances run afoul of 
the Sherman Act without delving into specific questions of patent law like infringement or 
invalidity.235  
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts would define the scope of the patent as relating instead 
solely to patent law.236 In his view, the whole point of a patent—to confer a limited monopoly as 
an incentive to encourage invention and sharing of public information237—requires giving the 
patent holder permission to engage in conduct that otherwise would violate the antitrust laws.238 
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According to Chief Justice Roberts, “pay to delay” settlement, like all other types of patent 
litigation settlements, falls within the scope of the patent because the patent owner always has 
the right to exclude an alleged infringer from making, using or selling the claimed invention.239 
Although the settlement resolves the litigation with some uncertainty remaining as to invalidity 
and infringement, that uncertainty does not render the settlement outside the scope of the patent, 
and thus, susceptible to being declared an unreasonable restraint on trade.240 The Chief Justice 
fears that the majority’s rule of reason analysis will fold in these questions of patent law in order 
to ascertain antitrust liability, a cumbersome and unwarranted intrusion that will discourage 
settlements.241  
Strikingly, Justice Breyer and Chief Justice Roberts both adhere to the basic and oft-
repeated legal rule taken from Line Material (which relies on Bement’s first iteration of this 
rule)242: “The precise terms of the grant define the limits of a patentee’s monopoly and the area 
in which the patentee is freed from competition.”243 The squabble in Actavis, and other 
contentious cases from the past decade, is over how courts should determine whether a patent 
owner is keeping within his exclusive statutory rights when engaging in activity that Justice 
Douglas referred to as “attractive private perquisites”244 grafted onto patents by owners using 
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contracts: licenses, assignments, post-sale notices, patent pooling agreements as in Bement, and 
settlements like the “pay to delay” agreements challenged in Actavis.245  
This tension between patent policy (to encourage innovation using private exclusive 
rights) and other policies (e.g., to encourage competition through antitrust, to encourage 
bargained for exchanges through contract) is not a new one—the twentieth century Court visited 
this question in many cases, most involving patents and competition, but it did so for the first 
time in Bement.246 Placed in this historical context, Actavis attempts to answer a profound 
question that has haunted the Court for more than a century: What kinds of anticompetitive 
restraints on trade are within the scope of the patent and which are without?247  
In Bement, the Court avoided the hard question of dissolving the Harrow Trust by 
focusing only on the contracts in evidence.248 However, the public nature of the Harrow Trust’s 
dealings, the decisions by at least two courts that the agreements in question in Bement were void 
as against public policy because they purported to restrain trade in harrows, and the extreme 
measures by which the trust protected its market share through threats of litigation and financial 
ruin apparently pushed some courts to interpret the decision as broadly giving patent agreements 
immunity from suit under the Sherman Act.249 As the Court grew more antagonistic to patent 
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monopolies, the mid-century Court comprehended that antitrust law, in fact, could police some 
of the more egregious conduct by patent owners to remove competition between each other, to 
raise prices, and to restrict output.250 Although the Court in Bement found no problem with price 
and use restrictions between a patent owner and a licensee, its inability to consider those 
restrictions in the context of a pool of competing patent owners who have agreed to sell 
substitute goods prevented the Court from earlier engaging with the complexities of a rule of 
reason.251 In all likelihood, National Harrow’s patent licensing scheme would not survive 
modern scrutiny under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.252  
The misperception of Bement as a case championing complete patent immunity from 
antitrust liability also plays an important role in the history of patent law and antitrust.253 Had the 
Court in Bement followed along with earlier cases rendering National Harrow’s activity 
unlawful, perhaps a per se rule prohibiting patent pooling agreements would be its lasting legacy, 
long forgotten as a more sophisticated rule of reason has replaced older per se rules.254 Instead, 
viewed in light of the debate in Actavis, regarding the contours of the scope of the patent applied 
to the unique circumstances of reverse payments, the spirit of Bement that frames a patent’s 
exclusive rights as exceptional remains an integral part of this debate.255  
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In the 1890s, the Sherman Act presented a host of unknowns for patent owners and lax 
enforcement enabled the proliferation of trusts like the Harrow Trust embodied in the practices 
of National Harrow.256 Bement, a profligate license violator, ended up fighting the trust all the 
way to the Supreme Court, but the surprising outcome left an enduring impression on the 
interplay between antitrust and patent law.257 In this way, the case has been both important and 
forgotten over time.258 Given the outcome in Actavis, and the possibility for a change of 
personnel on the Court that may shift it further to Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting view, 
perhaps the time has come for this forgotten case to be remembered for the way in which it 
pushed along the important patent-antitrust cases of the twentieth century.259  
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